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Abstract—Voice assistants like Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s As-
sistant, or Apple’s Siri, have become the primary (voice) interface
in smart speakers that can be found in millions of households.
For privacy reasons, these speakers analyze every sound in their
environment for their respective wake word like “Alexa” or “Hey
Siri,” before uploading the audio stream to the cloud for further
processing. Previous work reported on the inaccurate wake word
detection, which can be tricked using similar words or sounds
like “cocaine noodles” instead of “OK Google.”
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of such
accidental triggers, i. e., sounds that should not have triggered the
voice assistant, but did. More specifically, we automate the process
of finding accidental triggers and measure their prevalence across
11 smart speakers from 8 different manufacturers using everyday
media such as TV shows, news, and other kinds of audio datasets.
To systematically detect accidental triggers, we describe a method
to artificially craft such triggers using a pronouncing dictionary
and a weighted, phone-based Levenshtein distance. In total, we
have found hundreds of accidental triggers. Moreover, we explore
potential gender and language biases and analyze the repro-
ducibility. Finally, we discuss the resulting privacy implications
of accidental triggers and explore countermeasures to reduce and
limit their impact on users’ privacy. To foster additional research
on these sounds that mislead machine learning models, we publish
a dataset of more than 1000 verified triggers as a research artifact.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, we have observed a huge growth
in the popularity of voice assistants, especially in the form of
smart speakers. All major technology companies, among them
Amazon, Baidu, Google, Apple, and Xiaomi, have developed
an assistant. Amazon is among the most popular brands on the
market: the company reported in 2019 that it had sold more
than 100 million devices with Alexa on board; there were more
than 150 products that support this voice assistant (e. g., smart
speakers, soundbars, headphones, etc.) [8]. Especially smart
speakers are on their way of becoming a pervasive technology,
with several security and privacy implications due to the way
these devices operate: they continuously analyze every sound
in their environment in an attempt to recognize a so-called
wake word such as “Alexa,” “Echo,” “Hey Siri,” or “Xiaˇo du`
xiaˇo du`.” Only if a wake word is detected, the device starts to
record the sound and uploads it to a remote server, where it
is transcribed, and the detected word sequence is interpreted
as a command. This mode of operation is mainly used due to
privacy concerns, as the recording of all (potentially private)
communication and processing this data in the cloud would
be too invasive. Furthermore, the limited computing power
and storage on the speaker prohibits a full analysis on the
device itself. Hence, the recorded sound is sent to the cloud
for analysis once a wake word is detected.
Unfortunately, the precise sound detection of wake words
is a challenging task with a typical trade-off between usability
and security: manufacturers aim for a low false acceptance
and false rejection rate [50], which enables a certain wiggle
room for an adversary. As a result, it happens that these smart
speaker trigger even if the wake word has not been uttered.
First explorative work on the confusion of voice-driven user
input has been done by Vaidya et al. [60]. In their 2015 paper,
the authors explain how Google’s voice assistant, running on a
smartphone misinterprets “cocaine noodles” as “OK Google”
and describe a way to exploit this behavior to execute unautho-
rized commands such as sending a text, calling a number, or
opening a website. Later, Kumar et al. [35] presented an attack,
called skill squatting, that leverages transcription errors of a
list of similar-sounding words to existing Alexa skills. Their
attack exploits the imperfect transcription of the words by the
Amazon API and routes users to malicious skills with similar-
sounding names. A similar attack, in which the adversary
exploits the way a skill is invoked, has been described by
Zhang et al. [66].
Such research results utilize instances of what we call an
accidental trigger: a sound that a voice assistant mistakes
for its wake word. Privacy-wise, this can be fatal, as it will
induce the voice assistant to start a recording and stream it
to the cloud. Inadvertent triggering of smart speakers and the
resulting accidentally captured conversations are seen by many
as a privacy threat [12], [18], [40]. When the media reported
in summer 2019 that employees of the manufacturer listen to
voice recordings to transcribe and annotate them, this led to an
uproar [16], [62]. As a result, many companies paused these
programs and no longer manually analyze the recordings [20],
[28], [37].
In this paper, we perform a systematic and comprehensive
analysis of accidental triggers to understand and elucidate this
phenomenon in detail. To this end, we propose and imple-
ment an automated approach for systematically evaluating the
resistance of smart speakers to such accidental triggers. We
base this evaluation on candidate triggers carefully crafted
from a pronouncing dictionary with a novel phonetic distance
measure, as well as on available AV media content and bring it
to bear on a range of current smart speakers. More specifically,
in a first step, we analyze vendor’s protection mechanisms such
as cloud-based wake word verification systems and acoustic
fingerprints, used to limit the impact of accidental triggers.
We carefully evaluate how a diverse set of 11 smart speakers
from 8 manufacturers behaves in a simulated living-room-like
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scenario with different sound sources (e. g., TV shows, news,
and professional audio datasets). We explore the feasibility
of artificially crafting accidental triggers using a pronouncing
dictionary and a weighted, phone-based Levenshtein distance
metric and benchmark the robustness of the smart speakers
against such crafted accidental triggers. We found that a
distance measure that considers phone-dependent weights is
more successful in describing potential accidental triggers.
Based on this measure, we crafted 1-, 2-, and 3-grams as
potential accidental triggers, using a text-to-speech (TTS)
service and were able to find accidental triggers for all tested
smart speakers in a fully automated way.
Finally, we give recommendations and discuss countermea-
sures to reduce the number of accidental triggers or limit their
impact on users’ privacy.
To summarize, we make the following key contributions:
1) By reverse-engineering the communication channel of an
Amazon Echo, we are able to provide novel insights on
how commercial companies deal with such problematic
triggers in practice.
2) We develop a fully automated measurement setup that
enables us to perform an extensive study of the prevalence
of accidental triggers for 11 smart speakers from 8 man-
ufacturers. We analyze a diverse set of audio sources,
explore potential gender and language biases, and analyze
the identified triggers’ reproducibility.
3) We introduce a method to synthesize accidental triggers
with the help of a pronouncing dictionary and a weighted
phone-based Levenshtein distance metric. We demon-
strate that this method enables us to find new accidental
triggers in a systematic way and argue that this method
can benchmark the robustness of smart speakers.
4) We publish a dataset of more than 1000 accidental triggers
to foster future research on this topic.1
II. UNDERSTANDING ACCIDENTAL TRIGGERS
In this section, we provide the required background on
wake word detection. Furthermore, we describe how Amazon
deals with accidental triggers and how we analyzed and reverse
engineered an Amazon Echo speaker and end with an overview
of smart speaker privacy settings.
A. Wake Word Recognition
To enable natural communication between the user and the
device, automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems built into
smart speakers rely on a far-field voice-based activation. In
contrast to a push-to-talk model, where speech recognition is
only active after a physical button is pressed, smart speakers
continuously record their surroundings to allow hands-free use.
After detecting a specific wake word, also known as hotword
or keyword, the smart speaker starts to respond. The wake
word recognition system is often a lightweight DNN-based
ASR system, limited to a few designated words [4], [24], [64].
To guarantee the responsiveness, the recognition runs locally
and is limited by the computational power and storage of the
speaker. For example, we found the Computer wake word
model for an Amazon Echo speaker to be less than 2 MB
1They are available at: https://unacceptable-privacy.github.io
in size, running on a 1GHz ARM Cortex-A8 processor. The
speaker uses about 50% of its CPU time for the wake word
recognition process. In addition to the wake word, the model
also detects a stop signal (“Stop”) to interrupt the currently
running request. Especially when used in environments with
ambient noise from external sources such as TVs, a low false
acceptance and false rejection rate is most important for these
systems [50].
The device will only transmit data to the respective server
after the wake word has been recognized. Hence, activating
the wake word by an accidental trigger will lead to the upload
of potentially sensitive and private audio data, and should,
therefore, be avoided as far as possible.
In some cases, a speaker misinterprets another word or
sound as its wake word. If the misinterpreted word is unrelated
to the configured wake word, we refer to this event as an
accidental trigger. To limit the consequences of such false
wakes, vendors started to augment the local wake word recog-
nition with a cloud-based wake word verification. Moreover,
there is an acoustic fingerprint-based mechanism in place that
prevents a speaker from triggering when listening to certain
audio sequences observed in TV commercials and similar
audio sources. We describe both of these mechanisms in more
detail in Section II-D.
B. Voice Profiles and Sensitivity
Voice profiles, also referred to as “Voice Match” or “Rec-
ognize My Voice” feature, are a convenience component of
modern voice assistants [63]. The requisite voice training
was introduced with iOS 9 (2015), and Android 8 (2017) to
build context around questions and deliver personalized results.
On smartphones, a voice profile helps to recognize the user
better [5]. Vendors explain that without a profile, queries are
simply considered to be coming from guests and thus will not
include personal results [23].
In contrast to voice assistants on phones, smart speakers are
intended to be activated by third parties, such as friends and
visitors. Thus, voice profiles do not influence whether a smart
speaker is activated or not when the wake word is recognized.
In shared, multi-user environments, voice profiles enable voice
assistants to tell users apart and deliver personalized search
results, music playlists, and communication. The feature is also
not meant for security as a similar voice or recording can trick
the system [21]. In our experiments, voice profiles were not
enabled or used.
In April 2020, Google introduced a new feature that allows
users to adjust the wake word’s responsiveness to limit the
number of accidental activations [22]. In our experiments, we
used the “Default” sensitivity.
C. Alexa Internals
In the following, we describe how we analyzed and reverse
engineered an Amazon Echo speaker (1st Gen.). The speaker
was bought in February 2017 and was equipped with firmware
version 647 588 720 from October 2019.
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a) Rooting: To obtain root access on an Amazon Echo
speaker, we follow a method described by Clinton et al. [14]
that was later refined by Barnes [7]. To decrypt and analyze
the speaker’s communication with the Alexa API, we inject a
shared object that dumps all negotiated pre-master secrets into
a file, which we later use to decrypt the TLS protected traffic
recorded in the PCAP files using Wireshark.
b) From the Wake Word to the Response: The com-
munication between the Echo smart speaker and Amazon’s
cloud is handled by the AlexaDaemon using the latency-
optimized SPDY protocol. The first step is to authenticate the
device. After a successful authentication, the cloud requests
various information, e. g., volume levels, information about
currently playing songs, a list of paired Bluetooth devices, the
used Wi-Fi network, and the configured wake word, language,
and timezone.
Echo’s ASR engine is called Pryon and started from a fork
of the open-source speech recognition toolkit Kaldi [49]. On
our Amazon Echo speaker, we found four wake words models
Alexa, Computer, Echo, and Amazon, divided by the two differ-
ent device types doppler and pancake (Echo and Echo Dot),
and four different languages/regions (en-US, es-US, en-GB,
and de-DE). The local automatic speech recognition daemon,
ASRD, uses Pryon to detect the configured wake word. The
ASRD represents its certainty for recognizing the wake word
with a classifier score between 0.0 and 1.0.
The following six aspects are relevant for us: 1© In normal
use, a wake word score above 0.57 is categorized as an
“Accept.” A score between 0.1 (notification threshold) and 0.57
will be categorized as a “NearMiss.” The classifier threshold
for an accept is lowered to 0.43, if the device is playing music
or is in a call. A near miss will not trigger the LED indicator or
any components, and no audio will be processed or uploaded
to the Amazon cloud.
2© In contrast, an “Accept” will activate the AudioEncoder-
Daemon, which encodes the currently recorded audio. At the
same time, the Echo speaker switches to the SendingData-
ToAlexa state. The LED indicator turns on and starts to indicate
the estimated direction of the speech source. Moreover, the
AlexaDaemon informs the cloud about an upcoming audio
stream, together with the information where in the stream the
ASRD believes to have recognized the wake word.
3© The Amazon cloud then runs its own detection of the
wake word (cf. Section II-D1). 4© If the cloud recognizes
the wake word, it will send a transcription of the identified
question, e. g., “what are the Simpsons.” In response, Echo will
switch to the AlexaThinking mode and the LED indicator will
change to a blue circulating animation. In the meantime, the
conversational intelligence engine in the cloud tries to answer
the question.
5© Next, the Amazon cloud will respond with the spoken
answer to the question, encoded as an MP3 file, played using
the AlexaSpeechPlayer. Echo then notifies the cloud that it is
playing, and the LED indicator switches to a blue fade in/out
animation, while the speaker switches to the TTSFromAlexa
state. At the same time, the server requests the device to stop
sending the microphone input. 6© After the AlexaSpeechPlayer
finished, the AlexaDaemon informs the cloud about the suc-
cessful playback, and Echo switches the LED indicator off by
changing to the AlexaDialogEnd state.
Summarizing, we can confirm that the examined device
is only transmitting microphone input to Amazon’s cloud if
the LED indicator is active and hence acting as a trustworthy
indicator for the user. Based on a packet flow analysis, this is
also true for all other voice assistants. One exception is the
smart speaker built by Xiaomi, which seems to upload speech
that can be considered a near miss to overrule the local ASR
engine, without switching on the LED indicator.
D. Reducing Accidental Triggers
Next, we focus on two methods that vendors deployed in
an attempt to prevent or recover from accidental triggers.
1) Cloud-Based Wake Word Verification: As described
above, the local speech recognition engine is limited by the
speaker’s resources. Thus, in May 2017, Amazon deployed a
two-stage system [31], where a low power ASR on the Echo
is supported by a more powerful ASR engine in the cloud.
Accordingly, accidental triggers can be divided into two
categories: (i) local triggers that overcome the local classifier,
but get rejected by the cloud-based ASR engine, and (ii)
local + cloud triggers that overcome both. While a local
trigger switches the LED indicator on, a subsequent question
“{accidental local trigger}, will it rain today?” will not be
answered. In cases where the cloud does not confirm the wake
word’s presence, it sends a command to the Echo to stop the
audio stream. Surprisingly, the entire process from the local
recognition of the wake word to the moment where Echo
stops the stream and switches off the LED indicator only takes
about 1 − 2 seconds. In our tests, we observe that during
this process, Echo uploads at least 1 − 2 seconds of voice
data, approx. 0.5 seconds of audio before the detected wake
word occurs, plus the time required to utter the wake word
(approx. another second). In cases where the cloud-based ASR
system also detects the wake word’s presence, the accidental
trigger can easily result in the upload of 10 or more seconds
of voice data. During our experiments, we found that all major
smart speaker vendors use a cloud-based verification system,
including Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft.
2) Acoustic Fingerprints: To prevent TV commercials and
similar audio sources from triggering Echo devices, Amazon
uses an acoustic fingerprinting technique. Before the device
starts to stream the microphone input to the cloud, a local
database of fingerprints is evaluated. In the cloud, the audio is
checked against a larger set of fingerprints. The size of the local
database on an Amazon Echo (1st Gen.) speaker is limited by
its CPU power and contains 50 entries. This database gets
updated approximately every week with 40 new fingerprints,
which mostly contain currently airing advertisements [51] for
Amazon products. Until mid-May, the database contained dates
and clear text descriptions of the entries. Since then, only hash
values are stored. The database of Mai 2020 still contained
9 fingerprints from 2017, e. g., the “Echo Show: Shopping
Lists” YouTube video.
We evaluate some of the entries by searching for the
commercials and find videos where the ASRD reports a “[...]
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TABLE I: Smart Speaker Privacy Settings
Voice Recordings Local
Vendor Opt-Out Retention Delete Report Trigger
Amazon Yes 3, 18 months A, R, I Yes Yes
Apple Yes 6, 24 months A - -
Google Yes 3, 18 months A, R, I No Yes
Microsoft Yes* Unspecified A, I No No
*Cannot speak to Cortana anymore; A=All, R=Range, I=Individual.
strong fingerprint match.” However, we also observed false
positives, where fingerprint matches against commercials were
found, which were not present in the database, leaving the
robustness of the technique [25] in question. We found that
the metricsCollector process on the Echo speaker periodically
collects and uploads the detected fingerprints. This is partic-
ularly concerning for privacy since it shows an interest of
Amazon in these local fingerprint matches that could easily
be combined with the cloud matches and be abused to build
viewing profiles of the users [43]. If the wake word is spoken
on live TV, Amazon will register a large peak in concurrent
triggers with the same audio fingerprint and automatically
request the devices to stop [51].
E. Smart Speaker Privacy Settings
To learn more about how vendors handle their users’
data, we requested the voice assistant interaction history from
Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft using their respective
web forms. Among the tested vendors, Apple is the only
manufacturer that does not provide access to the voice data
but allows users to request their complete deletion.
In Table I, we analyzed if the user is able to opt-out of the
automatic storing of their voice data, how long the recordings
will be retained, the possibility to request the deletion of
the recordings, and whether recordings could be reported
as problematic. Furthermore, we checked if false activations
through accidental triggers, i. e., local triggers, are visible to
the user (“Audio was not intended for Alexa”). Apple reports
to store the voice recordings using a device-generated random
identifier for up to 24 months but promises to disassociate the
recordings from related request data (location, contact details,
and app data) [29], after six months. In contrast, customers
of Amazon and Google can choose between two different
voice data retention options. According to Google, the two
time frames of 3 and 18-months are owed to recency and
seasonality [48]. Microsoft’s retention policy is more vague,
but they promise to comply with legal obligations and to only
store the voice data “as long as necessary.”
III. EVALUATION SETUP
In this section, we describe our evaluated smart speakers
and the datasets we used for our measurement study.
A. Evaluated Smart Speakers
In our experiments, we evaluate 11 smart speakers as
listed in Table II. The smart speakers have been selected
based on their market shares and availability [10], [39]. In
the following, with the term smart speaker, we refer to the
hardware component. At the same time, we use the term voice
assistant to refer to cloud-assisted ASR and the conversational
intelligence built into the speaker.
Since its introduction in 2014, the Amazon Echo is one of
the most popular speakers. It enables users to choose between
four different wake words (“Alexa,” “Computer,” “Echo,” and
“Amazon”). In our experiments, we used four Echo Dot
(3rd Gen.) and configured each to a different wake word.
Similarly, for the Google Assistant, we used a Home Mini
speaker, which listens to the wake words “OK Google” and
“Hey Google.” From Apple, we evaluated a HomePod speaker
with “Hey Siri” as its wake word. To test Microsoft’s Cortana,
we bought the official Invoke smart speaker developed by
Harman Kardon that recognizes “Cortana” and “Hey Cortana.”
Moreover, we expanded the set by including non-
English (US) speaking assistants from Europe and Asia.
We bought three Standard Chinese (ZH) and one Ger-
man (DE) speaking smart speaker. The Xiaomi speaker listens
to “Xiaˇo a`i to´ngxue´” (小爱同学), which literately translates to
“little classmate.” The Tencent speaker listens to “Jiuˇsı`’e`r lı´ng”
(九四二零), which literately translates to the digit sequence 9-
4-2-0. The wake word is a phonetic replacement of “Jiu`shı` a`i
nıˇ,” which translates to “just love you.” The Baidu speaker
listens to “Xiaˇo du` xiaˇo du`” (小度小度), which literately
translates to “small degree,” but is related to the smart device
product line Xiaodu (little “du” as in Baidu). Finally, we
ordered the Magenta Speaker from the German telecommuni-
cations operator Deutsche Telekom, which listens to “Hallo,”
“Hey,” and “Hi Magenta.” In this case, magenta refers to a
product line and also represents the company’s primary brand
color. Deutsche Telekom has not developed the voice assistant
on their own. Instead, they chose to integrate a third-party
white-label solution developed by SoundHound [33]. While
the speaker also allows accessing Amazon Alexa, we have
not enabled this feature for our measurements. The Magenta
Speaker is technically identical to the Djingo speaker [45],
which was co-developed by the French operator Orange.
B. Evaluated Datasets
In the following, we provide an overview of the datasets
used to evaluate the prevalence of accidental triggers. We
included media to resemble content, which is most likely
played in a typical US household to simulate an environment
with ambient noise from external sources such as TVs [50].
Moreover, we considered professional audio datasets used by
the machine learning community.
a) TV Shows: The first category of media is TV shows. We
considered a variety of different genres to be most representa-
tive. Our list comprises popular shows from the last 10 years
and includes animated and a family sitcom, a fantasy drama,
and a political thriller. Our English (US) TV show dataset
includes Game of Thrones, House of Cards, Modern Family,
New Girl, and The Simpsons.
b) News: The second category is newscasts. As newscasts
tend to be repetitive, we used one broadcast per day and
television network only. The analyzed time frame covers
news broadcast between August and October 2019. Our En-
glish (US) newscasts dataset includes ABC World News, CBS
Evening News, NBC Nightly News, and PBS NewsHour.
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TABLE II: Evaluated Smart Speakers
ID Assistant Release Wake Word(s) Lang.† Smart Speaker SW. Version
VA1 Amazon: Alexa 2014 Alexa en us, de de Amazon: Echo Dot (v3) 392 657 0628
VA2 Amazon: Alexa 2014 Computer en us, de de Amazon: Echo Dot (v3) 392 657 0628
VA3 Amazon: Alexa 2014 Echo en us, de de Amazon: Echo Dot (v3) 392 657 0628
VA4 Amazon: Alexa 2014 Amazon en us, de de Amazon: Echo Dot (v3) 392 657 0628
VA5 Google: Assistant 2012 OK/Hey Google en us, de de Google: Home Mini 191 160
VA6 Apple: Siri 2011 Hey Siri en us, de de Apple: HomePod 13.4.8
VA7 Microsoft: Cortana 2014 Hey/- Cortana en us Harman Kardon: Invoke 11.1842.0
VA8 Xiaomi: Xiao AI 2017 Xiaˇo a`i to´ngxue´ zh cn Xiaomi: Mi AI Speaker 1.52.4
VA9 Tencent: Xiaowei 2017 Jiuˇsı`’e`r lı´ng zh cn Tencent: Tı¯ngtı¯ng TS-T1 3.5.0.025
VA10 Baidu: DuerOS 2015 Xiaˇo du` xiaˇo du` zh cn Baidu: NV6101 (1C) 1.34.5
VA11 SoundHound: Houndify 2015 Hallo/Hey/Hi Magenta de de Deutsche Telekom: Magenta Speaker 1.1.2
†: In our experiments, we only considered English (US), German (DE), and Standard Chinese (ZH).
c) Professional Datasets: The third category is professional
audio datasets. Due to the costly process of collecting appropri-
ate training datasets and the accessibility of plenty and well-
analyzed datasets, we considered professional audio datasets
commonly used by the speech recognition community. To
verify whether voice assistants are trained on such datasets,
we included the following English (US) datasets:
• LibriSpeech [46]: An audio dataset created by volunteers
who read and record public domain texts to create audio-
books. It contains 1, 000 hours of speech. The corpus has
been built in 2015 and is publicly available; it is a widely
used benchmark for automatic speech recognition.
• Mozilla Common Voice [19]: The dataset is based on
an ongoing crowdsourcing project headed by Mozilla to
create a free speech database. At the time of writing,
the project includes a collection of 48 languages. Our
English (US) version of the dataset contains 1, 200 hours
of speech and has been downloaded in August 2019. As
neither the environment nor the equipment for the audio
recordings is controlled, the quality of the recordings
differs widely.
• Wall Street Journal [47]: A corpus developed to support
research on large-vocabulary, continuous speech recog-
nition systems containing read English text. The dataset
was recorded in 1993 in a controlled environment and
comprises 400 hours of speech.
• CHiME: The CHiME (Computational Hearing in Multi-
source Environments) dataset is intended to train models
to recognize speech from recordings made by distant
microphones in noisy environments. The 5th CHiME
challenge dataset includes recordings from a group dinner
of four participants each, with two acting as hosts and two
as guests [6]. Audio signals were recorded at 20 parties,
each in a different home, via six Kinect microphone
arrays and four binaural microphone pairs. This dataset
thus provides multi-channel recordings of highly realistic,
distant-talking speech with natural background noise. In
total, the dataset consists of 50 hours of recording time.
d) Noise: We used noise recordings as a special category
to test the sensitivity of the voice assistants against audio data
other than speech. For this purpose, we used the noise partition
of the MUSAN dataset [57], containing approximately 6 hours
of many kinds of environmental noise (excluding speech and
music data).
e) Non-English Media: To test for linguistic differences,
e. g., biases between different languages, we tested one Stan-
dard Chinese (ZH) and four German (DE) TV shows. We
analyzed the Chinese TV show All Is Well and German-dubbed
version of the TV show Modern Family for easy comparison.
Additionally, we tested the German-dubbed version of The Big
Bang Theory, as well as, Polizeiruf 110 and Tatort as examples
for undubbed German TV shows. Moreover, we evaluated three
shorter (12 hours) samples of the Chinese newscast CCTV
Xinwen Lianbo and the German newscasts ARD Tagesschau
and ZDF Heute Journal.
f) Female vs. Male Speakers: To explore potential gender
biases in accidental triggers of voice assistants, we included
two sets of randomly chosen voice data from the aforemen-
tioned LibriSpeech dataset. Every set consisted of a female and
a male 24 hour sample. Every sample was built from multiple
20 minutes sequences, which themselves were made of 100
different 12 seconds audio snippets.
IV. PREVALENCE OF ACCIDENTAL TRIGGERS
Based on the datasets described above, we now explore the
prevalence of accidental triggers in various media such as TV
shows, newscasts, and professional audio datasets.
A. Approach
We start by describing our technical setup to measure the
prevalence of accidental triggers across 11 smart speakers (cf.
Section III-A) using 24 hour samples of various datasets (cf.
Section III-B). The basic idea is to simulate a common living
room-like scenario, where a smart speaker is in close proximity
to an external audio source like a TV [50], [54], [55].
1) Measurement Setup:
a) Hardware: The measurement setup consists of five
components, as depicted in Figure 1. To rule out any external
interference, all experiments are conducted in a sound-proof
chamber. We positioned 11 smart speakers at a distance of
approx. 1 meter to a loudspeaker (A) and play media files from
a computer (B). To detect any activity of the smart speakers,
we attach photoresistors (C) (i. e., light sensors) on the LED
activity indicator of each speaker, as one can see in Figure 2. In
the case of any voice assistant activity, the light sensor detects
the spontaneous change in brightness and emits a signal to
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Fig. 1: Setup: A loudspeaker (A) is playing media files from a
computer (B). The LED activity indicators of a group of smart
speakers are monitored using light sensors (C). All speakers
are connected to the Internet over Wi-Fi (D). A webcam (E)
is used to record a video of each measurement.
Fig. 2: Photoresistor attached to the LED indicator of a smart
speaker. The sensitivity of the sensor can be adjusted via a
potentiometer. Any activity is recognized and logged.
the computer (B). To prevent interference from external light
sources, the photoresistors are covered by a small snippet of
reusable adhesive tape. All smart speakers are connected to the
Internet using a WiFi network (D). During all measurements,
we record network traces using tcpdump to be able to analyze
their activity on a network level. To verify the measurement
results, we record a video of each measurement via a webcam
with a built-in microphone (E). The entire setup is connected
to a network-controllable power socket that we use to power
cycle the speakers in case of failures or non-responsiveness.
b) Software: To verify the functionality and responsiveness
of the measurement setup, we periodically play a test signal
comprising the wake word of each voice assistant. The test
signal consists of the wake word (e. g., “Alexa”) and the stop
word (e. g., “Stop”) of each voice assistant (in its configured
language) and a small pause in-between. Overall, the test signal
for all 11 speakers is approximately 2m 30s long. During the
measurements, we verify that each voice assistant triggers to
its respective test signal. In the case of no response, multiple
or prolonged responses, all voice assistants are automatically
rebooted and rechecked. As a side effect, the test signal ensures
that each assistant stops any previous activity (like playing
music or telling a joke). That might have been accidentally
triggered by a previous measurement run. Using this setup, we
obtain a highly reliable and fully automated accidental trigger
search system.
2) Trigger Detection: The process of measuring the preva-
lence of accidental triggers consists of three parts, as depicted
in Figure 3. First, a 24-hour search is executed twice per
dataset. Second, a ten-fold verification of a potential trigger
is done to confirm the existence of the trigger and measure
its reproducibility. Third, a manual classification of verified
triggers is performed to ensure the absence of the wake word
or related words. In the following, we describe these steps in
more detail.
I. Search: In a first step, we prepare a 24-hour audio sample
consisting of multiple episodes/broadcasts of approximately
20 minutes each (with slightly different lengths depending
on the source material) for each of the datasets introduced
in Section III-B. We play each of the 24-hour samples twice
and log any smart speaker LED activity as an indicator for
a potential trigger. The logfile includes a timestamp, the
currently played media, the playback progress in seconds, and
the triggered smart speaker’s name.
We played each audio file twice due to some changes in
results that were observed when we played the same sample
multiple times. These changes do not come as a great surprise,
given that they are due to the internal framing of the recorded
audio. Therefore, each time one plays the same audio file, the
system will get a slightly different signal, with slightly shifted
windows and possibly small changes in the additive noise that
cannot be fully prevented but is (strongly) damped in our
test environment. Also, there may be further indeterminacies
up in the chain of trigger processing, as was also noted by
others [18], [35].
II. Verification: In a second step, we extract a list of potential
triggers from the logfile and verify these triggers by replaying
a 10-second snippet containing the identified scene. From the
potential trigger location within the media, i. e., the playback
progress when the trigger occurred, we rewind 7 seconds and
replay the scene until 3 seconds after the documented trigger
location. This playback is repeated ten times to confirm the
existence and to measure the reproducibility of the trigger.
III. Classification: In a third step, every verified trigger is
classified by reviewing a 30-second snippet of the webcam
recording at the time of the trigger.Here, two independently
working reviewers need to confirm the accidental trigger by
verifying the correct wake word’s absence. If a trigger is
caused by the respective wake word or a related word such
as Alexander (“Alexa”), computerized (“Computer”), echoing
(“Echo”), Amazonian (“Amazon”), etc., we discard the trigger
and exclude it from further analysis. Where available, the anal-
ysis is assisted by the transcriptions/subtitles of the respective
dataset.
To determine the approximate distribution between local
and cloud-based triggers, we expand our classification step.
Instead of only determining the mere presence of the wake
word or a related word, two members of our team also classify
the triggers into local or local + cloud triggers. As noted in
Section II-E, not all smart speaker vendors provide access
or report local triggers in their voice assistant interaction
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Fig. 3: Trigger Detection Workflow: Every approx. 24-hour dataset is played twice. Subsequently, the existence of every potential
trigger is confirmed. Finally, every verified trigger is classified as accidental, if the wake word or a related word is not present
in the identified scene.
history. Thus, we use the internal processes, especially the
LED timings and patterns, to classify triggers. The heuristic
for that classification is based on the time the LED indicator of
the speaker remains on. Based on preliminary tests, we choose
a conservative threshold of 2 seconds of speaker activity to
classify the trigger as local + cloud. Moreover, we use voice
responses and certain LED patterns as obvious signals for a
local + cloud trigger. The inter-rater reliability between our
reviewers, measured by Cohen’s kappa, is κ ≥ 0.89 across all
evaluated datasets.
B. Results
An overview of our results can be found in Table III. We
report the absolute counts of observed accidental triggers and
actual instances of spoken wake words.
a) Comparison Across Speakers: Looking at the four
VA1-4 Amazon Echo wake words, we can see that “Amazon”
(57) and “Echo” (43) trigger less often than “Alexa” (99) and
“Computer” (77). Moreover, we observe that the VA5 Google
Home (16) and the VA6 Apple HomePod (8) seem to be
the most robust speakers of all English (US) speakers across
all played datasets, and we discuss potential reasons for that
in Section VII-A. Another noteworthy observation is that
VA7 Microsoft Cortana triggered far more often (197) than
the other speakers across all kinds of audio data.
From a qualitative perspective, the identified triggers are
often confusions with similar-sounding words or sequences,
such as, “a lesson” (Alexa), “commuter” (Computer), “OK,
cool” (OK Google), “a city” (Hey Siri). Another category are
proper names that are unknown or likely infrequently included
in the training data. Examples include names of persons
and states such as “Peter” and “Utah” (Computer), “Eddard”
(Echo), “Montana” (Cortana), but also uncommon old English
phrases such as “Alas!” (Alexa). Finally, we observed a few
cases of triggers that include fictional language (Dothraki)
or unintelligible language (gibberish) and two occasions of
non-speech accidental triggers: A ringing phone triggering
“Amazon” in the TV show New Girl and a honk made by
a car horn triggering “Alexa” in the TV show The Simpsons.
b) Comparison Across Datasets: When comparing across
datasets, one must keep in mind that the total playback time
differs across categories. While every dataset (i. e., every row
in the table) consisted of 24 hours of audio data, the number
of datasets per category differs.
In general, we cannot observe any noteworthy differences
in accidental triggers (A) across the three dataset categories. In
contrast, if we have a look at the cases where the wake word
was actually said (W), we see that this was very often the case
for “Computer” in the professional Wall Street Journal dataset
Fig. 4: Number of accidental triggers that are incorrectly
recognized by the local and the cloud-based ASR engine.
caused by an article about the computer hardware company
IBM and for “Amazon” across the news datasets. In this case,
the 62 instances of “Amazon” referred 13 times to the 2019
Amazon rainforest wildfires and 49 times to the company.
If we look at the professional datasets, the number of
triggers is within the same range or even increases compared to
TV shows and news. As such, we have not found a speaker that
triggered less often, because it might have been specifically
trained on one of the professional datasets. In contrast to
the other professional audio datasets, the CHiME dataset
consists of recordings of group dinner scenarios resulting in
comparatively less spoken words, explaining the overall lower
number of accidental activations. Not presented in Table III
is the MUSAN noise dataset, because we have not observed
any triggers across the different speakers. This suggests that
accidental triggers are less likely to occur for non-speech audio
signals.
c) Comparison Between Local and Cloud-Based Triggers:
An overview of the distribution can be seen in Figure 4.
Depending on the wake word, we find that the cloud ASR
engine also misrecognizes about half of our accidental triggers.
Fortunately for Cortana, only a small number of triggers (8 out
of 197) are able to trick Microsoft’s cloud verification.
d) Comparison Between Female and Male Speakers:
We performed an experiment designed to study a potential
model bias in smart speakers, a common problem for machine
learning systems [17], [34], [59]. Fortunately, across our tested
datasets, we cannot find any noteworthy difference in the
number of accidental triggers for female and male speakers; no
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TABLE III: Prevalence of Accidental Triggers and Wake Words.
Alexa Computer Echo Amazon
Ok Hey Hey Xiaˇo a`i Jiuˇsı`’ Xiaˇo du` Hallo
Google Siri Cortana to´ngxue´ e`r lı´ng xiaˇo du` Magenta
A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W
en us en us en us en us en us en us en us zh cn zh cn zh cn de de
TV Shows Time 31 0 31 6 18 2 38 2 3 0 2 0 94 0 1 0 7 0 0 0 3 0
Game of Thrones 24h 6 - 6 - 5 - 3 - - - - - 14 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 -
House of Cards 24h 2 - 11 - 2 2 15 - - - 1 - 14 - - - 3 - - - 1 -
Modern Family 24h 6 - 9 4 4 - 12 1 1 - 1 - 23 - - - 1 - - - 1 -
New Girl 24h 4 - 5 1 4 - 6 - 2 - - - 29 - - - 1 - - - - -
The Simpsons 24h 13 - - 1 3 - 2 1 - - - - 14 - - - 1 - - - - -
News Time 22 5 9 2 4 4 12 62 2 0 4 2 44 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 1 0
ABC World News 24h - - 3 - - - 2 9 1 - 1 - 11 - - - 1 - - - - -
CBS Evening News 24h 12 1 1 1 - - 7 24 - - - - 13 - - - 1 - - - 1 -
NBC Nightly News 24h 2 4 - - 2 1 - 23 1 - 2 2 6 - - - 2 - - - - -
PBS NewsHour 24h 8 - 5 1 2 3 3 6 - - 1 - 14 - 1 - - - - - - -
Professional Time 46 1 37 32 21 3 7 1 11 0 2 0 59 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 1 0
LibriSpeech 24h 14 - 9 - 6 2 5 - - - - - 17 - - - - - - - - -
Moz. CommonVoice 24h 10 1 21 5 14 1 2 1 11 - 2 - 18 - 1 - 1 - - - - -
WallStreetJournal 24h 22 - 7 27 1 - - - - - - - 24 - 1 - 2 - - - 1 -
CHiME 24h 1 - 3 3 - - 10 2 7 - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - - - - -
Sum 13d 100 6 80 43 43 9 67 67 23 0 9 2 198 0 4 0 15 0 0 0 5 0
A: Accidental triggers; W : Wake word said; Gray cells: Mismatch between played audio and wake word model language.
bias can be observed in our experiments. The detailed numbers
are shown in Table IV.
e) Comparison Across Languages: Somewhat expected is
the result that the three Chinese and the German smart speaker
do not trigger very often on English (US) content (cf. right
part of Table III). In Table V, we report the results for the
differences across languages to explore another potential model
bias of the evaluated systems. Even though we only tested a
small number of datasets per language, the number of triggers
of VA5 Google and VA6 Apple is very low and comparable
to their English performance. Given the fact that we played
the very same episodes of the TV show Modern Family in
English (US) and German, we find the wake word “Computer”
to be more resistant to accidental triggers in German (1) than
in English (9). A similar but less pronounced behavior can
be seen with “Alexa.” Moreover, we found that “big brother”
in Standard Chinese da`ge¯ (大哥) is often confused with the
wake word “Echo”, which is hence not the best wake word
choice for this language. Similarly, the German words “Am
Sonntag” (“On Sunday”), with a high prevalence notably in
weather forecasts, are likely to be confused with “Amazon.”
C. Reproducibility
During the verification step of our accidental trigger search,
we replayed every trigger 10 times to measure its reproducibil-
ity. This experiment is designed based on the insight that
accidental triggers likely represent samples near the decision
thresholds of the machine learning model. Furthermore, we
cannot control all potential parameters during the empirical
experiments, and thus we want to study if, and to which extent,
a trigger is actually repeatable.
We binned the triggers into three categories: low, medium,
and high. Audio snippets that triggered the respective assistant
1–3 times are considered as low, 4–7 times as medium, and
8–10 times as high. In Figure 5, we visualize these results.
We observe that across the Amazon and Google speakers,
around 75 % of our found triggers are medium to highly
reproducible. This indicates that most of the identified triggers
are indeed reliable and represent examples where the wake
word recognition fails. For the Apple and Microsoft speakers,
the triggers are less reliable in our experiments. One caveat
of the results is that the Chinese and German speakers’ data
are rather sparse and do not allow any meaningful observation
and interpretation of the results.
V. CRAFTING ACCIDENTAL TRIGGERS
The previous experiments raise the question of whether it is
possible to specifically forge accidental triggers in a systematic
and fully automated way. We hypothesize that words with
a similar pronunciation as the wake word, i. e., based on
12
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Fig. 5: Accidental Trigger Reproducibility. Note that the four
speakers below the dashed line do not use wake words in
English (US); “Xiaˇo du` xiaˇo du`” did not have any triggers.
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TABLE IV: Differences Between Female and Male Speakers.
Alexa Computer Echo Amazon
Ok Hey Hey Xiaˇo a`i Jiuˇsı`’ Xiaˇo du` Hallo
Google Siri Cortana to´ngxue´ e`r lı´ng xiaˇo du` Magenta
A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W
en us en us en us en us en us en us en us zh cn zh cn zh cn de de
Female Time 31 3 9 0 4 6 10 0 0 0 0 0 41 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
LibriSpeech I (F) 24h 9 2 8 - 2 4 4 - - - - - 19 - - - 1 - - - 1 -
LibriSpeech II (F) 24h 22 1 1 - 2 2 6 - - - - - 22 - 1 - - - - - 1 -
Male Time 33 0 8 0 0 8 8 2 1 0 0 0 46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LibriSpeech I (M) 24h 19 - 3 - - 4 5 2 - - - - 20 - 1 - - - - - - -
LibriSpeech II (M) 24h 14 - 5 - - 4 3 - 1 - - - 26 - - - - - - - - -
A: Accidental triggers; W : Wake word said; Gray cells: Mismatch between played audio and wake word model language.
TABLE V: Differences in Languages.
Alexa Computer Echo Amazon
Ok Hey Hey Xiaˇo a`i Jiuˇsı`’ Xiaˇo du` Hallo
Google Siri Cortana to´ngxue´ e`r lı´ng xiaˇo du` Magenta
A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W A W
English Time en us en us en us en us en us en us en us zh cn zh cn zh cn de de
Modern Family 24h 6 - 9 4 4 - 12 1 1 - 1 - 23 - - - 1 - - - 1 -
German Time de de de de de de de de de de de de en us zh cn zh cn zh cn de de
Modern Family 24h 1 1 1 13 3 - 13 1 2 - 2 - 17 - - - 1 - - - - -
The Big Bang Theory 24h - - 1 9 9 - 3 2 2 1 1 1 12 - - - - - - - 1 -
Polizeiruf 110 24h 3 - 4 7 3 - 13 - - - - - 18 - - - - - - - - -
Tatort 24h - - - 8 4 - 15 1 2 - - - 6 - - - - - - - - -
ARD Tagesschau 12h 3 - 1 1 - - 10 13 1 - - 1 29 - 1 - - - - - - -
ZDF Heute Journal 12h - - - 4 - - 5 3 - - - - 8 - - - 1 - - - - -
Standard Chinese Time en us en us en us en us en us en us en us zh cn zh cn zh cn de de
All Is Well 24h 1 - 1 - 9 - 6 - - - - - 28 - - - - - 2 - - -
CCTV X. Lianbo 12h 3 - 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 - 38 - - - 3 - - - - -
A: Accidental triggers; W : Wake word said; Gray cells: Mismatch between played audio and wake word model language.
similar phones (the linguistically smallest unit of sounds) are
promising candidates. In this section, we are interested in
crafting accidental triggers that are likely caused by the wake
word’s phonetic similarity.
A. Speech Synthesis
To systematically test candidates, we utilize Google’s TTS
API. To provide a variety across different voices and genders,
we synthesize 10 different TTS versions, one for each US
English voice in the TTS API. Four of the voices are standard
TTS voices; six are Google WaveNet voices [61]. In both cases,
the female-male-split is half and half.
Note that some words have more than one possible pronun-
ciation (e. g., T AH M EY T OW vs. T AH M AA T OW).
Unfortunately, we cannot control how Google’s TTS service
pronounces these words. Nevertheless, we are able to show
how, in principle, one can find accidental triggers, and we use
10 different voices for the synthesis to limit this effect.
B. Levenshtein Distance
To compare the wake words with other words, we use the
Fisher corpus [13] version of the Carnegie Mellon University
pronouncing dictionary [38], an open-source pronunciation
dictionary for North American English listing the phone se-
quences of more than 130, 000 words. We propose two ver-
sions of a weighted phone-based Levenshtein distance [44] to
measure the distance of the phonetic description of a candidate
to the phonetic description of the respective wake word in
order to find potential triggers in a fully automated way.
Using dynamic programming, we can compute the minimal
distance L (under an optimal alignment of the wake word and
the trigger word). Formally, we calculate
L = s · S + d ·D + i · I
N
(1)
with the number of substituted phones S, inserted phones
I , deleted phones D, and the total number of phones N ,
describing the weighted edit distance to transform one word
into another. The parameters s, d, and i describe scale factors
for the different kinds of errors.
In the following, we motivate our different scale factors:
During the decoding step of the recognition pipeline, a path
search through all possible phone combinations is conducted
by the automatic speech recognition system. In general, for
the recognition, the path with the least cost is selected as
the designated output of the recognition (i. e., wake word
or not wake word). Considering these principles of wake
word recognition, we assume that the different kinds of errors
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have different impacts on the wake word recognition, as e. g.,
utterances with deletions of relevant phones will hardly act as
a wake word.
To find the optimal scale factors, we conducted a hyper-
parameter search where we tested different combinations of
weights. For this, we played all different TTS versions of
50,000 English words and measured which of the voice assis-
tants triggered at least once. In total, we were able to measure
826 triggers. In a second, more advanced, version of this
distance measure, we considered phone-depended weights for
the different kinds of errors. A more detailed description of this
version of the distance measure is presented in Section V-C.
We ignore words which are either the wake word itself
or pronounced like parts of the wake word (e. g., “Hay” is
blocklisted for “Hey” or “computed” for “computer”). The
blocklist of the wake words contains a minimum of 2 words
(Cortana) and up to 6 words (Computer). For the optimization,
we used a ranked-based assessment: We sorted all 50, 000
words by their distance L and used the rank of the triggered
word with the largest distance as a metric to compare the
different weighted Levenshtein distances. With this metric, we
performed a grid search for s, d, i over the interval [0, 1] with
a step width of 0.05.
Note that not all accidental triggers can be explained
effectively with the proposed model. Therefore, in a first step,
we filter all available triggers to only include those that can
be described with this model. This step is necessary as we
are not interested in crafting all possible accidental triggers
such as noise, but accidental triggers that are likely caused by
the phonetic similarity to the wake word only. Also, in case of
the Invoke speaker and the Google Home Mini, these speakers
have two potential wake words. By focusing on the subset of
accidental triggers that can describe the respective wake word
more closely, we can filter out the other version of the wake
word. Specifically, we only used triggers were we were able to
describe the trigger with the proposed distance measure in such
a way that it remained within the first 1% (500) of words if we
overfitted the distance measure to that specific word. In other
words, we only considered triggers for our hyperparameter
search where a combination of scale factors exits such that
the trigger has at most the rank 500. After applying this filter
criterion, 255 out of the 826 triggers remained in the dataset.
C. Phone-Dependent Weights
For a more advanced version of the weighted Levenshtein
distance, we utilized information about how costly it is to
substitute, delete, and insert specific phones (i. e., intuitively
it should be less costly to replace one vowel with another
vowel in comparison to replacing a vowel with a consonant).
For this, we calculated phone-dependent weights as described
in the following: We used a trained automatic speech recogni-
tion (ASR) system and employed forced alignment, which is
usually used during the training of an ASR system to avoid
the need for a detailed alignment of the transcription to the
audio file. We can use this algorithm to systematically change
phones in the transcription of an audio file and measure the
costs of these specific changes.
To measure the impact of such changes, we distinguish
between deletions, substitutions, and insertions: To assess the
cost of the deletion of specific phones, we randomly draw
100 words that contain that specific phone and synthesize
10 versions of this word via Google’s TTS API. We use the
difference of the scores of the forced alignment output with
and without this specific phone for all TTS versions of the
word. For example, we use the word little with the phonetic
description L IH T AH L for the phone AH in Alexa and
measure the score of the forced alignment algorithm for L IH
T AH L and L IH T L. The loss in these two scores describes
the cost of deleting the sound ‘AH’ in this specific context.
For the final weights, we use the average over all 100 words
and 10 TTS versions and finally normalize the values of all
averaged phone costs to have a mean value of 1.0. The deletion
weights are shown in Figure 6.
Similarly, to determine the cost of all possible substitutions,
we replace the phone-under-test with all other phones for all
100 words and 10 TTS versions. The matrix of the substitution
weights is shown in Figure 7. Note that we only calculated the
weights of phones that occur in the wake words. Therefore,
the rows in the figure do not show all theoretically possible
phones. The rows of the matrix are also normalized to have an
average value of 1.0. Finally, we compare the scores between
the original transcription and insert the considered phone for
the insertion weights. These weights are also normalized to
have an average value of 1.0. The insertion weights are shown
in Figure 8. All weights are then used along with the scale
factors.
D. Cross-Validation
We performed a leave-one-out cross-validation to measure
the performance of Equation (1) in predicting whether words
are potential accidental triggers. For this purpose, we compared
three different versions of Equation (1): a version, with all
scales set to 1 (Unweighted), a scaled version where we
optimized the scale factors (Simple), and a version where
we used our optimized scale factors and the phone-dependent
weights (Advanced).
We have run a hyperparameter search for the simple and
the advanced version of eight wake words triggers for each fold
and tested the resulting scale factors on the remaining wake
word. The results in Table VI show the number of triggers
we find within the 100 words with the smallest distance for
all three versions of the Levenshtein distance and all wake
words. Note that the distances tend to cluster words into same
distances due to the fixed length of each wake word and,
TABLE VI: Results of the leaving-one-out cross-validation.
We report the numbers of triggers within the 100 words with
the smallest distance to the respective wake word.
ID Wake Word Total Unweighted Simple Advanced
VA1 Alexa 52 9 17 24
VA2 Computer 75 17 21 32
VA3 Echo 23 4 5 12
VA4 Amazon 12 1 1 7
VA5a OK Google 2 0 0 0
VA5b Hey Google 1 0 0 0
VA6 Hey Siri 7 3 3 5
VA7a Hey Cortana 38 9 9 6
VA7b Cortana 45 13 14 10
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Fig. 6: Deletion weights used for the advanced version of
the weighted Levenshtein distance. The higher the value, the
higher the costs if this phone is removed.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Fig. 7: Substitution weights used for the advanced version
of the weighted Levenshtein distance plotted as a matrix
describing the cost to replace the phone in the row with a
phone of the columns.
Fig. 8: Insertion weights used for the advanced version of
the weighted Levenshtein distance. The higher the value, the
higher the costs if this phone is inserted.
therefore, the same total number of phones N , especially for
the unweighted and the simple version.
For cases where it is not possible to clearly determine the
closest 100 words, we use all words with a smaller distance
than the 100th word and draw randomly out of the words with
the next largest distance until we obtain a list of 100 words
which makes sure to have a fair comparison in Table VI.
In the third column (Total), we show the total number of
words that triggered the perspective wake words, out of the
50,000 words, after filtering. Note that the Google wake words
TABLE VII: To craft realistic word combinations, we construct
word sequences based on n-grams from the CHiME transcrip-
tions. We report the numbers of triggers within the 100 n-grams
with the smallest distance to the respective wake word.
ID Wake Word 1-gram 2-gram 3-gram
VA1 Alexa 7 10 5
VA2 Computer 16 12 10
VA3 Echo 1 8 3
VA4 Amazon 2 11 4
VA5a OK Google 0 1 0
VA5b Hey Google 0 0 0
VA6 Hey Siri 2 2 0
VA7a Hey Cortana 8 8 4
VA7b Cortana 7 5 6
had only 1 or 2 triggers and that therefore not more than these
can be in the top 100.
The different versions of the Levenshtein distance generally
show better results for the simple and the advanced version
compared to the unweighted version, especially for all Amazon
wake words. Only for the two wake words from Microsoft, this
is not the case. Nevertheless, the advanced version shows the
best results on average and is, therefore, the version we use
in the following experiments. Notably, for e. g., Computer, ap-
proximately one third (32/100) of the words with the smallest
distance actually triggered the smart speaker and for many of
the wake words, more or almost half of all possible triggers
can be found within the 100 words with the smallest distance.
E. Performance on Real-World Data
With the optimized scale factors and weights, we evaluated
the distance measure on the transcriptions of the CHiME
dataset to assess the performance of the optimized distance
measure on real-world voice data. For this purpose, we con-
sidered n-grams to test also sequences of words that occur in
the CHiME transcriptions, namely 1-, 2-, and 3-grams.
We ran a hyperparameter search for the advanced version
of the Levenshtein distance (scale factors and phone-dependent
weights) on the triggers of all 9 wake words on the data
set used in Section V-D. For these, the optimal scale factors
are s = 1.46, d = 1.30, and i = 0.24, which we use for
the following experiments. We select the 100 words with the
smallest distance to the respective wake word from all 1-, 2-,
and 3-grams. In total, 300 n-grams for each wake word. All
these n-grams are then synthesized with Google’s TTS API.
The results of the CHiME n-grams are shown in Table VII. We
were able to find a significant number of triggers for almost
all of the wake words, like “fresh parmesan” for Amazon, “my
cereal” for Hey Siri, and “all acts of” for Alexa.
VI. RELATED WORK
There is an increasing amount of work focusing on the
security and privacy of smart speakers that motivate and guides
our research, as discussed in the following.
A. Smart Speaker Privacy
Malkin et al. [40] studied the privacy attitudes of 116
smart speaker users. Almost half of their respondents did not
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know that their voice recordings are stored in the cloud, and
only a few had ever deleted any of their recordings.Moreover,
they reported that their participants were particularly protective
about other people’s recordings, such as guests. Besides con-
versations that include children, financial, sexual, or medical
information, accidentally captured conversations were named
information that should automatically be screened out and
not stored. Lau et al. [36] studied privacy perceptions and
concerns around smart speakers. They found an incomplete
understanding of the resulting privacy risks and document
problems with incidental smart speaker users. For example,
they describe that two of their participants used the audio
logs to surveil or monitor incidental users. They noted that
current privacy controls are rarely used. For example, they
studied why users do not make use of the mute button on the
smart speaker. Most of their participants preferred to simply
unplug the device and give trust issues and the inability to
use the speaker hands-free as reasons not to press the mute
button. Similarly, Abdi et al. [1] explored mental models of
where smart speaker data is stored, processed, and shared.
Ammari et al. studied how people use their voice assistants
and found users being concerned about random activations and
documented how they deal with them [3]. Huang et al. [30]
studied users’ concerns about shared smart speakers. Their
participants expressed worries regarding voice match false
positives, unauthorized access of personal information, and the
misuse of the device by unintended users such as visitors. They
confirmed that users perceive external entities, such as smart
speaker vendors, collecting voice recordings as a major privacy
threat. Chung et al. [12] named unintentional voice recordings
a significant privacy threat and warned about entities with
legitimate voice data access and commercial interests, as well
as helpless users not in control of their voice data. Tabassum
et al. [58] studied always-listening voice assistants that do
not require any wake word. Zeng et al. [65] studied security
and privacy-related attitudes of people living in smart homes.
Their participants mentioned privacy violations and concerns,
particularly around audio recordings. In this paper, we study
the actual prevalence and implications of accidental triggers
with the goal of providing tangible data on this phenomenon,
as well as an effective process for assessing trigger accuracy
of devices by means of crafting likely accidental triggers.
Recently and concurrently, Dubois et al. [18] published a
paper where they played 134 hours of TV shows to measure
the prevalence of accidental triggers. Their setup relied on a
combination of a webcam, computer vision, and a network
traffic-based heuristic. Their work confirms our results in
Section IV. In contrast to our work, the authors focused
only on a comparatively small English TV show dataset
and English-speaking smart speakers. They did not consider
speakers from other countries, other languages, or other audio
datasets. Furthermore, while their work only speculates about
regional differences, our reverse engineering of Amazon Echo
internals confirms the existence of different wake word models
per language, region, and device type (e. g., en-US vs. en-GB).
Finally, we propose a method to craft accidental triggers that
enables us to find new triggers systematically.
B. Inaudible and Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples against speech recognition systems
try to fool the system to output a wrong transcription. For
human listeners, the adversarial examples are not at all or only
barely distinguishable from benign audio. In 2016, Carlini et
al. [11] have shown that targeted attacks against HMM-only
ASR systems are possible. To create their adversarial audio
samples, they used an inverse feature extraction. The resulting
audio samples were not intelligible by humans. Scho¨nherr et
al. [53] presented an approach where psychoacoustic modeling,
which is borrowed from the MP3 compression algorithm,
was used to re-shape the perturbations of the adversarial
examples. Their approach improves previous work by hiding
the changes to the original audio below the human hearing
thresholds. Later, the attack was ported to an over-the-air
setting by crafting examples that remain robust across different
rooms [52]. The accidental triggers identified by our work
can be combined with adversarial examples to wake up smart
speakers in an inconspicuous way.
VII. DISCUSSION
The results of our experiments suggest possible reasons
for the differences across wake words and raise the question
of why their vendors have chosen them in the first place. As
the underlying problem of accidental triggers, the trade-off
between a low false acceptance and false rejection rate is hard
to balance and we discuss potential measures that can help to
reduce the impact of accidental triggers on the user’s privacy.
A. Wake Word
a) Properties of Robust Wake Words: Looking at the
number of words in a wake word, one would assume a clear
benefit using two words. This observation is supported by the
results in Table VI, where “Cortana” leads to more triggers
than “Hey Cortana.” On the contrary, the shortest wake word
“Echo” has fewer triggers than “Hey Cortana,” suggesting that
not only the number of words (and phones) itself is important,
but the average distance to common words in the respective
language. These results suggest that increasing the number
of words in a wake word has the same effect as increasing
the distance to common words. If we consider the differences
in the prevalence of accidental triggers, and that adding an
additional word (e. g., “Hey”) comes at close to no cost for
the user, we recommend that vendors deploy wake words
consisting of two words.
b) Word Selection: Amazon shared some details about
why they have chosen “Alexa” as their wake word [9]: The
development was inspired by the LCARS, the Star Trek
computer, which is activated by saying “Computer.” Moreover,
they wanted a word that people do not ordinarily use in
everyday life. In the end, Amazon decided on “Alexa” because
it sounded unique and used soft vowels and an “x.” The co-
founder of Apple’s voice assistant chose the name “Siri” after
a co-worker in Norway [27]. Later, when Apple turned Siri
from a push-to-talk into a wake word-based voice assistant,
the phrase “Hey Siri” was chosen because they wanted the
wake word to sound as natural as possible [5]. Based on those
examples we can see that the wake word choice in practice
is not always a rational, technically founded decision, but
driven by other factors like marketing as in “OK Google,”
“Amazon,” “Xiaˇo du` xiaˇo du`,” or “Hallo Magenta,” or based
on other motivations such in the case of “Siri” or “Computer.”
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Another issue can arise when trying to port a wake word across
languages. An example of that is the confusion of da`ge¯ (“big
brother”) and “Echo” described in Section IV-B, and it gets
even more complicated in multilingual households [56].
B. Countermeasures
a) Local On-Device Speech Recognition: In 2019, Google
deployed an on-device speech recognizer on a smartphone
that can transcribe spoken audio in real-time without an
Internet connection [26], [32]. We find such an approach to
be promising, as it can help to reduce the impact of accidental
triggers by limiting the upload of sensitive voice data. After the
local ASR detects the wake word, one can imagine a speaker
that transcribes the audio and only after being ensured to have
detected a user command/question, uploads the short wake
word sequence for cloud verification. When both ASR engines
agree about the wake word’s presence, the command/question
is forwarded to the cloud in text or audio form. Coucke et al
has described a smart speaker that runs completely offline and
is thus private-by-design [15].
b) Device-Directed Queries and Visual Cues: Ama-
zon presented a classifier for distinguishing device-directed
queries from background speech in the context of follow-up
queries [2], [41]. While follow-up queries are a convenience
feature, one can imagine a similar system that can reduce the
number of accidental triggers. Mhaidli et al. [42] explored
the feasibility to only selectively activate a voice assistant
using gaze direction and voice volume level by integrating a
depth-camera to recognize a user’s head orientation. While this
approach constitutes a slight change in how users interact with
a smart speaker, it effectively reduces the risk of accidental
triggers, by requiring a direct line-of-sight between the user
and the device. However, their participants also expressed
privacy concerns due to the presence of the camera.
c) Privacy Mode and Safewords: Previous work [36] has
documented the ineffectiveness of current privacy controls,
such as the mute button, given the inability to use the speaker
hands-free when muted. We imagine a method similar to a
safeword as a possible workaround for this problem. For this,
the speaker implements a privacy mode that is activated by
a user saying, “Alexa, please start ignoring me,” but could,
for example, also be activated based on other events such
as the time of the day. In the privacy mode, the speaker
disables all cloud functionality, including cloud-based wake
word verification and question answering.
The speaker’s normal operation is then re-enabled by a
user saying, “Alexa, Alexa, Alexa.” Repeating the wake word
multiple times is similar to a behavior observed when parents
call their children multiple times, if they do not like to listen,
this will feel natural to use. Due to the requirement to speak
the somewhat lengthy safeword, accidental triggers will only
happen very rarely. We imagine this privacy control to be more
usable than a mute button, as the hands-free operation is still
possible. As only the wake word is repeated multiple times,
we think that vendors can implement this functionality using
the local ASR engine.
d) Increased Transparency: Another option is to increase
transparency and control over the retention periods and individ-
ual recordings. In particular, our experience with Microsoft’s
Privacy Dashboard made it clear that vendors need to imple-
ment features to better control, sort, filter, and delete voice
recordings. Amazon’s and Google’s web interface already
allow a user to filter interactions by date or device easily. In
particular, we imagine a view that shows potential accidental
triggers, e. g., because the assistant could not detect a question.
Currently, accidental triggers are (intentional) not very present,
and are easy to miss in the majority of legitimate requests. If
accidental triggers are more visible, we hope that users will
start to more frequently use privacy controls such as safewords,
the mute button, or to request the deletion of the last interaction
via a voice command, e. g., “Hey Google, that wasn’t for you.”
At first, integrating such a functionality seems unfavorable to
vendors, but it can easily be turned into a privacy feature that
can be seen as an advantage over competitors.
C. Limitations
We have neither evaluated nor explored triggers for varying
rooms and acoustic environments, e. g., distances or volumes.
Even if this might influence the reproducibility, this was not
part of our study, as we focused on the general number of ac-
cidental triggers in a comparable setup across all experiments.
This also implies that our results are somewhat tied to the
hard- and software version of the evaluated smart speakers.
Our results are subject to change due to model updates for
the local ASR or updates of the cloud model.
Furthermore, we are dealing with a system that is not
entirely deterministic, as others already noted [35]. Accidental
triggers we mark as local triggers, sometimes overcome the
cloud-based recognizer and vice versa. The findings are mainly
based on the English (US) language; even though we also
played a limited set of German and Standard Chinese media,
our results are not applicable to other languages or ASR
models.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of
accidental triggers in voice assistants and explore their impact
on the user’s privacy. We explain how current smart speakers
try to limit the impact of accidental triggers using cloud-based
verification systems and analyze how these systems affect
users’ privacy. More specifically, we automate the process
of finding accidental triggers and measure their prevalence
across 11 smart speakers. We describe a method to artificially
craft such triggers using a pronouncing dictionary and a
weighted phone-based Levenshtein distance metric that can
be used to benchmark smart speakers. As the underlying
problem of accidental triggers, the trade-off between a low
false acceptance and false rejection rate is hard to balance. We
discuss countermeasures that can help to reduce the number
and impact of accidental triggers. To foster future research on
this topic, we publish a data set of more than 1000 accidental
triggers.
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